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Abstract: Many firms use investor relations (IR) to communicate with investors and 
the financial community through meetings, conference calls, and presentations. Engaging 
in IR provides benefits to firms, including increased liquidity, lower cost of capital, 
higher stock prices, and higher market value. This study evaluates IR in the context of 
restatements by exploring the effects of IR activities (during the pre- and post-restatement 
announcement periods) and investor perceived IR quality (during the pre-restatement 
announcement period) on cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the period surrounding 
the restatement announcement. Using a sample size of 199 restatements from S&P 500 
firms from 2012 through 2018, this study adds to the growing IR literature by exploring 
the impact of IR on CARs in the wake of restatement announcements. While support for 
the hypothesized relationships was not evident in this specific sample, this study provides 
some insights into the relationship between IR and CAR during the period surrounding 
restatement announcements. This study also discusses avenues for future research to 
continue investigating these relationships. 
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Many firms use investor relations (IR) to communicate with investors through 
meetings, events, conference calls, presentations, and roadshows (NIRI Analytics, 
2016a). According to the 2016 NIRI Analytics Report, 73% of large-cap firms surveyed 
reported allocating $1,000,000-$2,499,999 to their IR function. Marston (1996) defines 
IR as the connection between companies, financial professionals, and investors that 
allows interested parties to assess a company’s financial position. IR serves to reduce 
information asymmetry (Rodrigues & Galdi, 2017; Agarwal et al., 2008) and increase 
information assimilation (Chapman, Miller, & White, 2018). As IR provides more 
information, there is less known by management that is not known by investors. IR serves 
to complement or assimilate existing disclosures, which is essential as disclosures 
become longer and more complex (Chapman et al., 2018). By providing a clearer picture 
of a firm’s financial and strategic priorities, IR assists the market in assimilating 
information (Chapman et al., 2018). To illustrate the importance and added value of IR, 
examples from two S&P 500 firms, Emerson Electric and United Rentals, are provided 
below.
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During Emerson Electric’s second quarter earnings call on May 5, 2015, Emerson’s 
Chairman and CEO, David Farr, indicated that within approximately six months the company 
would make a decision on whether to keep its Network Power business in the portfolio. On 
the May 5 call, in response to an analyst question about Network Powers strategic 
importance in Emerson’s portfolio, Farr responded: 
I put my sword in the ground, I think, almost 2.5 years ago. I said 3 years. So I don't 
think the time frame has changed one iota. I just think that what try to do at the board 
level is talk to the day-to-day, how do we get our costs in line quickly to deal with the 
price cost issues, to deal with the lower volume. And then strategically, you just don't 
want to ignore the strategic issues that we face as a company from our portfolio mix, 
and we'll do that on a systematic approach that makes sense. (Emerson, 2015a, p. 9) 
The information shared by Farr on the May 5 earnings call indicated that Network Power 
may be sold or spun off in the near future. On May 6, 2015, directly following the earnings 
call, Henry Kirn, Rohit Kadni, and Gael de-Bray (2015, p. 5) of Société Générale included 
Farr’s comments regarding Network Power in an analyst note. Société Générale specifically 
noted Farr’s comments regarding future portfolio decisions: 
Specifically to the Network Power segment, CEO Farr pointed out that 2.5 years ago 
he said he would evaluate the business for three years and does not believe this 
timeframe has changed. Accordingly, EMR is focused on getting Network Power 
costs in line with the current low volume environment and creating value from the 
business.  
The inclusion of this information in the analyst note provides evidence that Farr’s 
comments were considered to be important by professional investors and likely impacted 
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their investment opinions regarding Emerson. Emerson subsequently announced that it was 
looking to spin off Network Power in a press release on June 30, 2015 (Emerson, 2015). 
Ultimately Emerson sold Network Power to Platinum Equity on December 1, 2016 
(Emerson, 2016). 
This example illustrates the information shared by Emerson through IR activities, 
namely, the question and answer session of Emerson’s second quarter earnings call. Investor 
relations provides an avenue for communicating managements’ decision-making processes 
regarding future actions and keeping the investing community informed in a way that extends 
beyond the information provided in SEC filings or financial statements.   
In addition to communicating with investors through IR activities such as earnings calls, 
conversations between management and investors represent another important IR function. 
The following example provides evidence of professional investors speaking directly to 
management after United Rentals (URI) first announced an SEC inquiry on August 31, 2004 
(United Rentals, 2004a). On September 1, 2004, Joel Tiss, Henry Kirn, and Andy Kaplowitz 
of Lehman Brothers issued an analyst note in response to the URI’s SEC inquiry (Tiss et al., 
2004). They noted (p. 2), “We spoke with URI management on Monday, and the SEC 
inquiry came as a surprise to management. Although the company appears eager to get 
details out into the market, management does not yet know the scope or purpose of the 
inquiry.”  
The analysts’ comments provide evidence that Lehman contacted URI as soon as the 
inquiry was announced to obtain more information. Following the announcement of the SEC 
inquiry, URI’s stock dropped 9.3% from August 30 to September 1, 2004 (United Rentals, 
2004b). The inquiry led to an SEC investigation resulting in URI restating its 2002-2003 
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financials (United Rentals, 2008). The URI SEC inquiry and investigation resulted in two 
years of restated financials and a $14 million settlement due to financial fraud (Accounting 
Today, 2008).  
As demonstrated in the example provided above, IR may be particularly important during 
times of high uncertainty or crisis. The Lehman Brothers analyst note specifically mentions 
an analyst contacted URI’s management to request additional information regarding the SEC 
inquiry and provides evidence that during this uncertain time investors were seeking 
additional information from URI. When uncertainty is high, investors may draw conclusions 
based on inaccurate or incomplete financial information, leading to knee-jerk reactions or 
overcorrections by the market. As a result, companies increase their investment in IR during 
times of greater uncertainty since reducing uncertainty provides the highest potential for 
future gains (Kirk & Vincent, 2014). Investing in IR during periods of uncertainty may 
provide an ideal opportunity for firms to maximize the benefits from their IR function. 
An ideal context to evaluate IR is the period surrounding restatement announcements, 
which are known to have a high degree of uncertainty. In the wake of restatement 
announcements, investors know less about a firm than they knew the day before the 
announcement, creating a high level of uncertainty. After restatement announcements, 
investors question the information provided by firm management and the quality of financial 
statement reporting (Badertscher, Hribar, & Jenkins, 2011; Palmrose, Richardson, & Scholz, 
2004; Hribar & Jenkins, 2004; Ettredge, Huang, & Zhang, 2013). Using IR to keep investors 
informed during this period by providing more information and helping to assimilate the 
information shared may help mitigate adverse market reactions related to restatements.  
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The restatement literature provides strong evidence of negative market reactions 
following restatement announcements (Ettredge et al., 2013; Burks, 2011; Badertscher et al., 
2011; Kravet & Shevlin, 2010; Palmrose et al., 2004; Hribar & Jenkins, 2004; Anderson & 
Yohn, 2002; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996). Hribar and Jenkins (2004) found negative 
4-12% cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following restatement announcements. Lack of 
information assimilation by the market may contribute to negative market reactions 
(Chapman et al., 2018). If information is available but not easily understood by the market, it 
is of little value and may not be considered for decision-making purposes. Using IR to 
provide investors with a clear understanding of the information surrounding a restatement 
may help manage expectations and reduce the negative impact on stock returns.  
In this study, I answer the call to conduct additional IR research (Agarwal et al., 2016; 
Kirk & Vincent, 2014) and add to the nascent investor relations literature. Following 
Chapman et al. (2018), I contribute to the IR literature by evaluating IR in the context of 
restatement announcements, an event-specific circumstance in which IR may be particularly 
important for firms. I also add to the restatement literature by providing additional insights 
into which aspects of investor relations impact stock returns and market reactions following 
restatement announcements.  
The accounting literature has yet to evaluate the relationship between investor relations 
and stock returns surrounding restatement announcements. Thus, I apply the accounting and 
finance literature on investor relations to examine IR leading up to and directly following 
restatement announcements. I investigate whether: (1) IR activities during the pre-
restatement announcement period, (2) investor perceived IR quality during the pre-
restatement announcement period, and (3) IR activities during the post-restatement 
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announcement period are considered by the market when determining price implications in 
the period surrounding restatement announcements.  
The study of investor relations in the context of restatement announcements has practical 
and theoretical implications. From a practical perspective, evaluating IR as it relates to 
restatements should help firms gain a better understanding of how investor relations can help 
mitigate the negative impact on stock prices in the wake of restatements. Investor relations 
reduces information asymmetry by providing more information to the investing community 
through conference calls, meetings, and presentations. IR also helps the market assimilate 
information as financial statement users interpret and understand the broader implications of 
the restatement information, including how restatements may impact the value of the firm 
(Chapman et al., 2018). 
Evaluating IR in the context of restatements may provide insights into how firms can use 
IR during the pre- and post-announcement periods to reduce negative financial impacts and 
may help answer an important question. During times of uncertainty, when communication 
with the investing community matters most, can IR help firms reduce negative stock returns 
during the period surrounding restatement announcements? The following sections include a 
review of the relevant literature in Chapter II, the theoretical considerations and hypothesis 
development in Chapter III, the research design and empirical methodologies in Chapter IV, 





REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
 
The following section includes a review of the accounting and finance literature 
related to investor relations and restatement literature streams. The relevant investor 
relations literature includes the benefits and potential drawbacks to engaging in investor 
relations and the role of the information environment, information asymmetry, and 
information assimilation in investor relations. The relevant restatement literature includes 
an overview of the well-documented market reactions to restatements, restatement 
disclosure methods, and the impact of disclosure during the pre- and post-announcement 
periods on stock returns following restatement announcements. This section concludes 
with an overview of investor relations in the context of restatements and explains how 
this study extends the emerging investor relations literature by evaluating the impact of 
IR activities and investor-perceived IR quality on stock returns following restatement 
announcements. 
Investor Relations 
Given the broad audience of individuals with a vested interest in understanding a 
firm’s disclosures and financial position, the study of investor relations is of interest to 
practitioners, researchers, and investors. IR is a relatively new area of study within the 
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accounting and finance literature. The investor relations literature remains limited, providing 
many opportunities for future research (Agarwal et al., 2016). According to the National 
Investor Relations Institute (NIRI Board of Directors, 2003), “Investor relations is a strategic 
management responsibility that integrates finance, communication, marketing and securities 
law compliance to enable the most effective two-way communication between a company, 
the financial community, and other constituencies, which ultimately contributes to a 
company's securities achieving fair valuation.” Investor relations often serves as a distinctly 
separate organizational function at the intersection of finance and communication (Laskin, 
2009; Hoffmann, Tietz, & Hammann, 2018). Communication is an essential component of 
investor relations, but IR is primarily viewed in connection with firms’ financial functions 
(Petersen & Martin, 1996).  
According to Laskin (2009), the historical underpinnings of IR in the United States began 
in the early 1800s when publicly traded companies began issuing stock to raise capital for 
expansion. The first stock issuances represented the first separation of management and 
ownership interests. According to Hoffman et al. (2018), the field of IR and the idea of an 
organizational function focusing on strategic communication of financial information began 
to grow in the 1960s when executives began using IR to communicate with investors and 
shareholders. As a separate organizational function, IR has only existed for roughly 50 years 
in the United States (Hoffman et al., 2018). IR grew in popularity in the 1980s and 1990s. 
According to Laskin (2009), more firms used IR to communicate with investors. After many 
highly publicized scandals, including Enron and Tyco, in the early 2000s, IR was used to 
help restore investor confidence. Building trust and creating a channel for open 
communication between firms and investors assisted in rebuilding investors’ confidence.  
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Much of the existing IR literature provides evidence of the benefits related to engaging in 
IR. Karolyi and Liao (2017) suggest that IR positively impacts institutional ownership, media 
coverage, and market value. These positive impacts may explain why firms allocate 
significant resources to IR programs (Bank of New York, 2017; Hong & Huang, 2005; 
Rodrigues & Galdi, 2017). The growing literature suggests that firms engaging in IR 
experience an increased analyst following (Karolyi & Liao, 2017; Kirk & Vincent, 2014; 
Agarwal et al., 2008), increased liquidity (Agarwal et al., 2008, 2016; Kirk & Vincent, 2014), 
lower cost of capital (Ly, 2010), higher stock prices (Agarwal et al., 2008), higher market 
value (Karolyi & Liao, 2017; Agarwal et al., 2016), positive future operating performance 
(Jiao, 2011), reduced information asymmetry (Brennan & Tamarowski, 2000), and more 
robust information environments (Kirk & Vincent, 2014).  
While most studies showcase the benefits of engaging in IR, there is some evidence to 
suggest a potential downside or dark side of IR that reduces firm value (Karolyi & Liao, 
2017). Peasnell, Talib, and Young (2011) find that IR firms are more negatively affected by 
fluctuations in investor confidence and reductions in the overall market following unethical 
behavior and corporate scandals. Solomon (2012) finds that firms with external IR 
consultants have more positive than negative press releases present in their media coverage, 
creating a “media spin” that results in higher returns surrounding news announcements but 
lower returns around earnings announcements. Cohen, Lou, and Malloy (2013) find that  
“casting” firms, those who select only analysts providing the highest recommendations to 
participate in earnings conference calls, experience an increased likelihood of a future 
restatement. Dennis (1973) finds that hiring an external IR firm does not affect the 
corporation’s common stock price, on average.   
10 
Information Environment, Information Asymmetry, and Information Assimilation 
Investor relations impacts multiple aspects of the information environment, including 
information asymmetry and information assimilation. IR increases the information 
environment (Kirk & Vincent, 2014), decreases information asymmetry (Rodrigues & Galdi, 
2017), and increases information assimilation (Chapman et al., 2018). Kirk and Vincent 
(2014) find that firms engaging in IR have more robust information environments. IR 
activities such as conference calls (Beyer et al., 2010), presentations (Francis, Hanna, & 
Philbrick, 1997), conversations, and interactions with the investment community increase the 
information environment by voluntarily disclosing information. A well-developed 
information environment allows IR to assist firms throughout the normal course of business 
and during high levels of uncertainty or times of crisis (Kirk & Vincent, 2014).  
Investor relations activities such as conference calls and presentations increase the 
amount of information available to investors, which decreases information asymmetry (Ly, 
2010). As more information is made available through IR, the disparity of what is known by 
management but what is not known by investors decreases. The increased communication 
and disclosure help to reduce information asymmetry and information risk (Ettredge et al., 
2013). Providing information to investors through IR activities may also help assimilate the 
information and provide a more thorough understanding, increasing investor's ability to use 
the information for decision-making purposes (Chapman et al., 2018). The information 
provided in press releases, annual reports, or presentations may not adequately convey 
information that can be easily understood. As disclosures become longer and more complex, 
the role of information assimilation becomes even more critical (Chapman et al., 2018). IR 
can help with the assimilation of information by the market by assisting market participants 
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in understanding how certain information contributes to the broader picture of the firm and 
how it impacts firm value. Chapman et al. (2018) find that firms with internal IR directors 
assisted with information assimilation by the market leading to positive market effects, 
including lower stock price volatility, lower analyst forecast dispersion, and higher analyst 
forecast accuracy.  
Restatement Announcements 
Restatements occur for a variety of reasons, including misapplication of accounting 
standards, intentional misrepresentation of financial information, and accounting errors 
(Plumlee & Yohn, 2010). Restatements have adverse effects on corporations, executives, and 
the reliability of financial information provided by firms (Ettredge et al., 2013). Restatements 
lead to greater information asymmetry and increase information risk, resulting in negative 
market reactions (Ettredge et al., 2013). The strong negative market reactions to restatements 
are well documented in the literature. Prior studies find CARs ranging from -4% to ‒12% 
(Ettredge et al., 2013; Burks, 2011; Badertscher et al., 2011; Kravet & Shevlin, 2010; Hribar 
& Jenkins, 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Anderson & Yohn, 2002; Dechow et al., 1996).  
Market Reactions Following Restatements 
 
Evidence suggests that market reactions following restatement announcements are more 
negative for restatements involving revenue recognition, fraud (Palmrose et al., 2004; 
Anderson & Yohn, 2002), longer misreporting periods, a greater number of financial 
accounts, less transparent restatement disclosure methods (Hogan & Jonas, 2016; Plumlee & 
Yohn, 2008), and restatements initiated by auditors or management (Palmrose et al. 2004; 
Hribar & Jenkins, 2004). Lower cumulative abnormal returns following restatement 
announcements are attributed in part to the increased level of uncertainty during the 
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restatement period. The uncertainty surrounding restatements is evidenced by reduced trust 
between investors and restating firms (Gordon et al., 2013), investors’ concerns about the 
ability to rely on the information provided by management, and the quality of the financial 
information provided by restating firms (Hribar & Jenkins, 2004).  
Palmrose et al. (2004) find an average of -9%  CARs using a two-day window 
surrounding restatement announcement dates. Palmrose et al. (2004) find that lower 
abnormal returns following restatements are associated with restatements involving fraud, a 
higher number of financial accounts, restatements that reduce reported income, restatements 
with a longer misreporting period, and restatements initiated by auditors or management 
(Palmrose et al., 2004; Hribar & Jenkins, 2004). The length of the restatement misreporting 
period also impacts CAR (Sievers & Sofilkanitsch, 2018). Palmrose et al. (2004) find CAR 
of -10% for restatements that impact more than one quarter compared to CAR of -5% for 
those only impacting one quarter.  
Anderson and Yohn (2002) find negative market returns during the seven-day window 
beginning three days before the restatement announcement date and ending three days after 
the date. The negative market reactions following the restatement announcements are more 
severe for restatements involving revenue recognition and fraud, with negative cumulative 
abnormal returns of -13.38% for restatements involving revenue recognition and negative 
CAR of -19.72% for fraud-related restatements.  
Badertscher et al. (2011) find more (less) negative CAR when managers bought (sold) 
stock before an accounting restatement announcement and less (more) negative CAR when 
companies repurchase (issue) stock before an announcement. Badertscher et al. (2011) use 
two return windows to evaluate the restatement impact on firms’ CAR. The first window is 
13 
five days around the restatement beginning two days before the restatement announcement 
and ending two days after. The second began three days before the restatement 
announcement date and ended 60 days after to evaluate results in the post-restatement period. 
Restatement Disclosure Methods  
The disclosure method for restatement announcements has been shown to impact market 
reactions following restatement announcements (Hogan & Jonas, 2016; Scholz, 2014; 
Plumlee & Yohn, 2008). There are two widely accepted disclosure methods for restatements. 
Reissuances (“big R” restatements) are disclosed through an 8-K SEC filing and are 
considered more transparent than revisions (“little r” restatements) (Hogan & Jonas, 2016). 
Revision restatements are considered less transparent and are not disclosed through an 8-K 
filing (Hogan & Jonas, 2016). Reissuances generate more negative market reactions 
compared to revisions (Hogan & Jonas, 2016; Plumlee & Yohn, 2008). 8-K filings for item 
4.02 are required in the case of “Non-Reliance on Previously Issued Financial Statements or 
a Related Audit Report or Completed Interim Review” (SEC, 2019). Scholz (2014) finds 
stronger negative reactions to reissuance restatements compared to revision restatements. 
Reissuance restatements reduced share prices by 5.3% following restatement announcements 
compared to a 0.6% reduction in share prices for revision restatements (Scholz, 2014; Sievers 
& Sofilkanitsch, 2018). Restatement disclosure methods have yet to be studied in the context 
of investor relations. Due to data limitations, this study focuses only on revision restatements 
to evaluate the relationship between investor relations and stock returns following 
restatement announcements. 
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Pre- and Post-Restatement Announcement Periods 
IR activities occurring during the pre- and post-restatement announcement periods each 
offer different insights into management choices and decisions. Gordon et al. (2013) find that 
increased pre-announcement discretionary disclosure surrounding restatement 
announcements results in less negative market reactions. Gordon et al. (2013), explain that 
these results may indicate managements’ openness, acknowledging their efforts to reduce 
information asymmetry by increasing the level of trust between firms and investors. Gordon 
et al. (2013) measure pre-announcement disclosure using press releases issued during the 12-
months before restatement announcements and find the quantity and the tone of press 
releases issued 12-months before the announcement are positively associated with abnormal 
returns at the time of restatement announcements. 
Gordon et al. (2013) also find that increased concurrent discretionary disclosure 
surrounding restatement announcements result in less negative market reactions. Concurrent 
and post-announcement disclosure occurring in the wake of a restatement likely reflects 
management’s choices related to a specific restatement event (Gordon et al., 2013; Palmrose 
et al., 2004). Disclosure of information during the post-restatement announcement in 
response to a specific restatement event may not be enough to mitigate the negative market 
reaction following restatement announcements (Gordon et al., 2013). Thus, I evaluate both 
pre- and post-restatement announcement IR activities.  
Investor Relations and Restatements  
The study of investor relations in event-specific circumstances, such as restatement 
announcements, largely remains unexplored in the literature. Studies specific to IR and 
restatements are minimal and do not directly assess IR’s impact on stock returns following an 
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accounting restatement. Chapman et al. (2018) find that the presence of an internal IR officer 
mitigates the contagion effect from accounting restatements for peer firms in the same 
industry. However, they do not explore how IR activities surrounding a restatement impact 
firms’ stock performance. The exogenous shock from peer firm restatements provides 
insights into the impact of IR on stock returns for similar firms (Chapman et al., 2018). 
However, the question remains: how do IR activities surrounding restatement announcements 
impact firms’ stock returns?  
During times of high uncertainty, such as the time surrounding a restatement, firms may 
benefit from reducing uncertainty by engaging in more IR activities and increasing the 
information environment. Companies increase their investment in IR during times of greater 
uncertainty, as the reduction of uncertainty provides the highest potential for future gains 
(Kirk & Vincent, 2014). Due to the high level of uncertainty during the period surrounding 
restatement announcements, an ideal context is provided to evaluate the impact of IR on 
stock returns. In the wake of restatement announcements, open and honest communication 
between firms and the investment community becomes a top priority (Ettredge et al., 2013). 
Using investor relations to communicate with investors about restatements may reduce 
uncertainty, reduce information asymmetry, and increase information assimilation, allowing 





THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Investor relations activities such as meetings, conference calls, and presentations 
increase the information shared with investors. Enhanced communication with investors 
through IR activities reduces information asymmetry by increasing the amount of 
information available to them (Ly, 2010). Disclosing more information may reduce the 
disparity between what management knows versus what is known by investors or the 
public, thereby decreasing information asymmetry. In addition, communicating with 
stakeholders through IR activities may also help assimilate information by the market so 
users of financial information can understand the implications of restatement 
announcements and use the information for decision-making purposes (Chapman et al., 
2018). If information is available but not understood by the intended users, the 
information is of little consequence. Information assimilation allows information to be 
more easily understood. In the case of restatements, prompt communication is essential as 
it takes time to process and understand the information related to restatement 
announcements. Quicker communication through investor relations provides investors 
with more time to review and understand the information.  
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To fully assess the impact of IR activities, it is essential to consider IR activity that 
occurs during the pre-restatement announcement (pre-announcement) and post-restatement 
announcement (post-announcement) periods. IR activity from each period may capture 
different information. IR activity before the restatement announcement captures the 
information environment more broadly, whereas the new IR activity during the period 
immediately following the announcement is likely in direct response to the restatement 
announcement. IR activity during the post-announcement period combined with investor 
relations during the pre-announcement period provides a comprehensive view of IR activity 
related to restatement announcements. 
Evaluating IR activity during the pre-announcement period captures the ongoing efforts 
by management to self-monitor. Pre-restatement IR activity may also indicate management's 
willingness to disclose information on an ongoing basis not only during a significantly 
adverse event such as a restatement (Gordon et al., 2013; Palmrose et al., 2004). I assessed 
the impact of IR activity during the pre-announcement period on the CAR during the period 
surrounding restatement announcements. Following Gordon et al. (2013), I evaluated pre-
announcement IR activity using transcripts for IR activities during the 365 days leading up to 
the restatement announcement date. Transcripts were used as a proxy to measure IR activity 
to capture the count of conference presentations, earnings calls, M&A calls, Analyst/Investor 
Days, Shareholder/Analyst calls, and Guidance/Update calls for each firm during the 365 
days leading up to announcements. I anticipated a stronger positive relationship between IR 
activity during the pre-announcement period and CARs during the period surrounding 
restatement announcements. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative form. 
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Hypothesis 1: Firms that engage in more IR activity during the 365 days before a 
restatement announcement (pre-announcement period) will experience less negative 
(higher) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the period surrounding the 
restatement announcement.   
In addition to the quantity of information provided through investor relations during the 
pre-announcement period, it is also important to consider IR quality. Regardless of the 
amount of information provided, it must be accurate and understandable to add value. If the 
information provided through IR cannot be understood or assimilated by the market, it is not 
likely to be considered for decision-making purposes. Investor relations literature calls for 
future research to investigate IR quality (Kirk & Vincent, 2014). Prior literature found that 
firms with higher perceived IR quality experience higher abnormal returns and higher market 
value (Agarwal et al., 2008). If the information provided through investor relations is 
perceived to be of higher quality by investors, it may have more of an effect on CARs 
surrounding restatement announcements. In response to the call from Kirk and Vincent, 
2014, I evaluated the impact of investor perceived IR quality on CAR following restatement 
announcements. Building on the findings of Agarwal et al. (2008), I anticipated that firms 
with higher investor perceived IR quality during the pre-announcement period would 
experience less negative (higher) cumulative abnormal returns during the period surrounding 
restatement announcements. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis, stated in the 
alternative form.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with higher investor perceived IR quality in the latest II poll 
before the restatement announcement (pre-announcement period) will experience less 
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negative (higher) cumulative abnormal returns during the period surrounding the 
restatement announcement.   
Considering that firms are likely not aware of a restatement before it is discovered, IR 
activity occurring during the post-announcement period is important to evaluate. Post-
announcement IR activity is likely to be in response to a restatement announcement. IR 
activity and investor perceived IR quality are relevant during both the pre- and post-
announcement periods. While IR activity (Hypothesis 1) and investor perceived IR quality 
(Hypothesis 2) are both evaluated during the 365-day pre-announcement period, the post-
announcement period focuses specifically on IR activity that takes place during the three 
days following the restatement announcement (Hypothesis 3). The short three-day window of 
time following announcements does not provide adequate time to properly measure IR 
quality during the post-announcement period as these are unlikely to have changed over such 
a short window.  
IR activity during the post-announcement period is important for management to address 
the concerns of investors by disclosing information related to the restatement. The post-
announcement period likely captures management’s one-time or short-term communication 
efforts in response to a single restatement event (Gordon et al., 2013; Palmrose et al., 2004). 
Management's response in the wake of a restatement may be particularly important to help 
investors understand the impact of the restatement. I evaluated IR activity during the post-
announcement period in the days directly following the restatement announcement. Timely 
communication about the factors influencing the restatement may help mitigate the negative 
stock impacts in the wake of the announcement. Extending the work of Gordon et al. (2013), 
I evaluated the impact of IR activity during the post-announcement period from the day of 
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the restatement announcement through the two days after the announcement. I anticipated a 
strong positive relationship between IR activity during the post-announcement period and 
CARs during the period surrounding restatement announcements. Thus, I propose the 
following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form.  
Hypothesis 3: Firms that engage in more IR activity during the period directly 
following a restatement announcement (post-announcement period) will experience 
less negative (higher) cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the period 





EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGIES AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample Selection and Data Sources 
This chapter provides the sample selection process used to investigate the impact of 
investor relations during the pre- and post-announcement periods on stock returns 
surrounding restatement announcements. Table 1 provides a summary of the sample selection 
process leading to the final sample. The initial sample of restatements includes 3,270 
restatements from July 1, 2012, through June 30, 2018, obtained from Audit Analytics (AA). 
The final sample focuses on S&P 500 firm restatements, excluding 3,059 non-S&P 500 firm 
restatements. Firms listed on the S&P 500 index as of July 1 each year from 2012 through 
June 30, 2018, remain in the sample for a subtotal of 211 firms. The sample excludes nine 
reissuance restatements due to the limited number of reissuances available in the sample and 
the significant differences between reissuance (“big R”) restatements and revision (“little r”) 
restatements (Hogan & Jonas 2016; Plumlee & Yohn, 2008). Finally, the sample excludes 
three restatements due to missing control variable data. The final number of restatements 
included in the sample is 199. The final sample focuses on S&P 500 firms because the S&P 
500 represents nearly 80% of market capitalization in the United States (S&P Dow Jones 
Indices, 2019), thus providing a representative sample of large U.S. firms. The sample period 
begins in 2012 due to data limitations for two of the independent variables. Capital IQ, the 
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transcript data source for pre- and post-IR activity, only has limited transcript data available 
before 2012.  




Restatements in Audit Analytics for sample period 7/1/2012 - 6/30/2018 3,270 
Restatements for non-S&P500 firms (3,059) 
“Big R” restatements with 8-K item 4.02 (9) 
Restatements eliminated due to missing control data (3) 
Restatements included in the final sample 199 
  
The data sources used for each variable included Audit Analytics (AA), Compustat, 
Eventus, Capital IQ, Institutional Investor (II) Magazine, and CRSP. AA was used to obtain 
the initial list of restatements. It is the most recent and prominent data source for restatement 
studies (Sievers & Sofilkanitsch, 2018). I matched the restatements from the AA database by 
company name, ticker, and f-key to the Compustat Annual Index Constituents for the S&P 
500. Eventus was used to calculate the dependent variable, CAR, using data from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Eventus calculated the CAR for the +2 to -2 five-day 
event window.  
The data sources for pre- and post-IR activity independent variables included Capital IQ 
and Institutional Investor (II) Magazine. Capital IQ provided the number of transcripts (calls) 
for presentations and conference calls that took place during the pre- and post-announcement 
periods. IR activity was measured separately for the pre- and post-announcement periods by 
calculating the number of calls before the announcement date (Calls Before) and capturing 
whether a call took place on or after the announcement date (Call After). Data provided by 
Institutional Investor (II) Magazine captured investor perceived IR quality (Top Three II 
Ranking). The II database provided the ranking of each firm’s IR program based on votes 
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received for the U.S. Investor Relations Perception Study conducted by Institutional Investor 
(II) Magazine.  
The control variables were obtained from the AA and CRSP databases. The restatement-
specific controls related to fraud, SEC, auditor, and board/audit committee involvement, 
impact on core earnings, earnings change, pervasiveness, and length came from the AA 
database. The firm size and leverage control variables were acquired using Compustat. 
Research Methodology and Empirical Model Specification  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) measured over five days 
extending from the two days before the restatement announcement to the two days after. (i.e., 
-2 through +2) with day 0 representing the restatement announcement date. Following Hribar 
and Jenkins (2004), this short-term event window captures the impact of the restatement 
announcement on stock returns in the days immediately surrounding the announcement, to 
capture any information leakage. Eventus was used to calculate the CARs for each model. 
Using Eventus, the following market-adjusted estimation model was used to calculate the 
abnormal returns using market-adjusted returns (Brown & Warner, 1985): 
ARit = Rit ‒ Rmt 
where 
         ARit = abnormal return of stock ί on day t,  
 Rir =  return of stock ί on day t, 
 Rmt  =  return of the CRSP value-weighted index on day t. 
Using the CRSP Daily Stock Database, the daily stock returns Rit were calculated by 
subtracting the beginning daily stock price from the closing stock price to find the daily 
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change in stock price for each day during the event window. The change in daily stock price 
plus cash dividends paid divided by the closing stock price two days before the 
announcement date. Following Palmrose et al. (2004) the market return, Rmt  was obtained 
from the CRSP value-weighted index for each day. The daily abnormal return ARit was 
calculated for each stock by subtracting the daily market return per the CRSP value-weighted 
index from the daily stock return. 
The daily abnormal returns for each stock ί, were summed to calculate the CARs over the 
five day, -2 to +2, event window surrounding the restatement announcement. The summation 
of the abnormal returns is calculated as follows. 




CARi  = the summation of daily abnormal returns for each stock ί. The ARit  for the five-
day event period beginning with 𝑘 = day ‒ 2 of the event window through l = day + 2 of the 
event window.  
To evaluate the relationship between investor relations and stock returns surrounding the 
restatement announcement, I used the following regression equation to regress each of the 
three independent variables: 1) investor relations activities during the pre-restatement 
announcement period (Calls Before), 2) an indicator for investor relations activities during 
the post-announcement period (Call After), and 3) investor perceived IR quality (Top Three 
II Ranking) on CAR. Controls for restatement materiality, severity, and firm size were 
included. A complete list of control variables is provided below and available in Appendix I.  
Following Chapman et al. (2018) the empirical model used for this regression is as follows. 
CARi [-2, +2] = β0 + β1 Investor Relationsi + Controlsi + εi 
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CARi [-2, +2] is the cumulative abnormal return for each stock measured from two days 
before the restatement announcement date (-2) through two days after the restatement 
announcement (+2). β1 Investor Relationsi represents each of the three independent variables: 
Calls Before, Call After, and Top Three II Ranking. Controlsi includes restatement-specific 
controls including whether the restatement involved fraud, the board of directors/audit 
committee, an SEC investigation, the firm's auditor if the restatement impacted core earnings, 
a change in earnings as a result of the restatement, the number of accounts impacted, the 
period of time the restatement covered, firm size, and leverage.  
Primary Independent Variables 
Building on Kimbrough and Louis (2011) and Green et al. (2014), who used transcripts to 
evaluate IR activity, I measured Calls Before using a count of conference call and 
presentation transcripts obtained from the Capital IQ database. The transcript types included 
Conference Presentations, Earnings Calls, M&A Calls, Analyst/Investor Days, 
Shareholder/Analyst Calls, and Guidance/Update Calls. IR activity during the  
pre-announcement period captured the number of transcripts during the 365 days before the 
restatement announcement. I measured Call After based on if a conference call existed in the 
Capital IQ database for the restating firm from the day of the restatement announcement 
through the two days after the announcement. The transcript types used to measure Calls 
Before are the same types used to measure Call After.  
Agarwal et al. (2008) find that investor perceived IR quality leads to higher market value 
and higher abnormal returns. Building on prior research, I used the votes of buy-side analysts 
in the “Best Investor Relations Program” poll by Institutional Investor (II) Magazine to 
classify each firm’s investor perceived IR quality. Top Three II Ranking is an indicator 
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variable based on if the firm was ranked in the top three within their industry by buy-side 
analysts. Firms ranked within the top three by industry are considered to have higher investor 
perceived IR quality compared to firms not ranked within the top three in their industry.  
Control Variables  
Consistent with the control variables used in prior restatement literature, the selected 
variables are intended to control for the financial statement effects following restatements 
(Gordon et al., 2013). Following Chapman et al. (2018), Gordon et al. (2013), Badertscher et 
al. (2011), and Palmrose et al. (2004), I controlled for restatements involving fraudulent 
activity (Fraud), an SEC investigation (SEC Investigation), board or audit committee 
knowledge of the restatement (Board/Audit Committee), auditors’ knowledge of the 
restatement (Auditor Letter or Discussion), and whether the restatement impacted the firm's 
core earnings (Core Earnings).  
Following Gordon et al. (2013), to control for the materiality of the restatements, I 
included the change in earnings related to the restatement (Earnings Change) calculated by 
dividing restated earnings by total assets at the end of the prior period (ACC Rest NI/Assets). 
To capture the pervasiveness of the restatement (Pervasiveness), I controlled for the number 
of account groups involved in the restatement. Due to data limitations I used five of the seven 
account groups used by Gordon et al. (2013), including revenue, cost of sales, operating 
expenses, merger-related, and other. Also capturing pervasiveness, I included the total time 
period of the restatement, measured as 0.25 for each quarter (Length) of earnings restated.  
Following Gordon et al. (2013) and Palmrose et al. (2004) firm size (Size) and leverage 
(Leverage) controls were included as well as interactions between them and the magnitude of 
the restatement (Earnings Change). Leverage (Leverage) is calculated as the book value of 
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long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets as of year end prior to the 
restatement announcement and firm size (Size) is calculated as the natural log of the book 
value of total assets at the year end prior to the restatement announcement. Interaction effects 
for both leverage and firm size and the change in earnings resulting from the restatement 
were included (Leverage*Earnings Change and Size*Earnings Change). A complete list of 





RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
The final sample consisted of 199 restatements from S&P 500 firms over a six-year 
period from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2018. A fiscal year of July through June was used to 
align the restatements with the most recent Institutional Investor (II) Best IR Program 
ranking. II voting for the Best IR Program occurs during May and June of each year. The 
restatements included in the final sample by year are shown in Table 2.Table 2 Each year 
in the sample period includes approximately 10-20% of the total sample. The highest 
number of restatements, 39/199 or 20% of the final sample, are from the period ended 
June 30, 2014. The lowest number of restatements, 19/199 or 10% of the final sample, 
are from the period ended June 30, 2018. The restatements by industry are shown in 
Table 3. The industry was determined using the two-digit SIC codes associated with each 
firm’s industry. A majority of the restatements included in the sample, 102/199 or 51%, 
represent Manufacturing firms, followed next by Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate firms, 
which make up 28/199 or 14% of the sample. 
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FY Ended June 30, 2013 37 19 
FY Ended June 30, 2014 39 20 
FY Ended June 30, 2015 37 19 
FY Ended June 30, 2016 36 18 
FY Ended June 30, 2017 31 16 
FY Ended June 30, 2018 19 10 
Total 199 100 
 




Mining 10 5 
Construction 3 1 
Manufacturing 102 51 
Transportation & Public Utilities 17 9 
Wholesale Trade 4 2 
Retail Trade 13 7 
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 28 14 
Services 22 11 
Total 199 100 
Note: Industries are defined using two-digit SIC codes: mining = 10-14, construction 15-17, 
manufacturing 20-39, transportation & public utilities = 40-49, wholesale trade = 50-51, retail trade 
= 52-59, finance insurance and real estate = 60-67, services = 70-89. 
 
The descriptive statistics for each variable are shown in Table 4. Panel A displays the 
descriptive statistics for the continuous variables, including CAR, Calls Before, Earnings 
Change, Length of the restatement period, Leverage, Firm Size, and Pervasiveness.  
Table 4 provides the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for 
each continuous variable. The mean value for CAR (-0.0034) is very close to zero, with 
values in the sample ranging from -31% to 25% compared to the value weighted index. On 
average the restatements in the sample included approximately seven and one-half Calls 
Before the restatement announcement with values ranging from one to 22 calls before. The 
mean value for Earnings Change (-0.0014) is very small, on average with values ranging 
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from a nearly 11% decrease in earnings to a 0.95% increase. 144/199 (72%) of the 
restatements had no impact on earnings, 16/199 (8%) had a positive impact on earnings, and 
39/199 (20%) had a negative impact on earnings. The mean value for restatement Length is 
1.86 years with values ranging from .25, one quarter, to 17.75 years. The mean value for 
Leverage dividing book value of long-term debt by total assets is .26 with values ranging 
from 0.00 to 0.87. The mean Size of firms in the sample using the natural log of the book 
value of total assets is 9.77 with values ranging from 6.13 to 14.55. The mean Pervasiveness, 
or number of account groups involved in the restatement is 1.23 account with values ranging 
from 1 to 3 accounts.   
Panel B displays the discrete variables, including Top Three II Ranking, Call After, 
Fraud, Core Earnings, Auditor Letter, SEC Investigation, and Board or Audit Committee 
Involvement. Panel B provides the number of each discrete variable represented in the sample 
and the percentage of each variable present in the sample. For example, the Top Three II 
Ranking number shows that 36/199 or 18% of the firms included in the sample were ranked 
within the top three in their industry in the latest II poll. As for Call After, approximately 
half, 94/199 or 47% of the restatements included in the sample completed at least one call 
after the restatement was announced. As for the control variables, only one restatement (0.5% 
of the sample) involved Fraud, 37 (19%) impacted the firms Core Earnings, 39 restatements 
(20%) involved an Auditor Letter or Discussion, two restatements (1%) involved an SEC 
Investigation, and one restatement (0.5%) involved the Board/Audit Committee). Appendix I 




Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
Panel A Continuous Variables 
Variable Name N Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variable 
CAR 199 -0.0034 0.0004 0.0580 -0.3139 0.2533 
Independent Variable 
Calls Before 199 7.6533 7.0000 3.1647 1.0000 22.0000 
Control Variables 
Earnings Change 199 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0094 -0.1061 0.0095 
Length 199 1.8668 1.2500 1.7445 0.2500 17.7500 
Leverage 199 0.2622 0.2520 0.1648 0.0000 0.8756 
Size 199 9.7721 9.5853 1.3185 6.1348 14.5596 
Pervasiveness 199 1.2312 1.0000 0.5093 1.0000 3.0000 
 
Panel B Discrete Variables 
 
Variable Name N Number Percent 
Independent Variables 
Top Three II Ranking 199 36 18.0 
Call After 199 94 47.0 
Control Variables 
Fraud 199 1 0.5 
Core Earnings 199 37 19.0 
Auditor Letter or Discussion 199 39 20.0 
SEC Investigation 199 2 1.0 
Board/Audit Committee 199 1 0.5 
 
The correlations between each variable are presented in Table 5. The significance level of 
each correlation is indicated within the correlation matrix. There does not appear to be strong 
or statistically significant correlations between the independent variables: Top Three II 
Ranking, Calls Before, and Call After. Top Three II Ranking and Calls Before appear to be 
relatively uncorrelated (-0.01). Top Three II Ranking and Call After have a weak positive 
correlation of 0.13. The correlation between Calls Before and Call After also appears to be 
very low (0.02).  
Calls Before measured the quantity of calls that occurred during the 365 days leading up 
to the restatement announcement. Call After captured whether the company had a conference 
call within two days of a restatement announcement. Calls Before and Call After assume 
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each call is equivalent and do not take into consideration the information shared during the 
call or the duration of the call. While conference calls are one type of IR activity, there are 
other factors including one-on-one private calls and conversations between firms and 
investors that are not captured by these measures.  
As for the Top Three II Ranking variable, when investors determine which firms they 
vote for in the II poll, they are likely to consider more than just the public conference calls 
hosted by a firm. Investors likely also consider individual meetings, personal experiences, 
and other communication with firm representatives. The additional components of IR 
considered by buy-side analysts may help explain the lack of correlation between the Calls 
Before, Call After, and Top Three II Ranking variables as well as each variable’s specific 
relation to restatements. The correlations between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable, CAR, also do not appear to be strong or statistically significant. The 
relationship between the Top Three II Ranking and CAR appears to have a weak negative 
correlation (-0.10). The relationship between Calls Before and CAR also appears to be weak 
and negatively correlated (-0.04). The relationship between Call After and CAR is weak and 
slightly positive (0.06). 
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Before Call After Pervasiveness 
Fraud  -0.0351 0.7053*** -0.0051 -0.0334 0.0372 0.0751 -0.1075 
Auditor Letter or Discussion  
 
-0.0497 0.1439** -0.0347 0.0340 -0.1628** 0.0004 
SEC Investigation  
  
-0.0072 -0.0474 0.0209 0.0056 -0.1525** 
Board/Audit Committee  
   
-0.0334 0.0372 -0.0672 0.0323 
Top Three II Ranking  
    
-0.0103 0.1306 0.0340 
Calls Before  
     
0.0268 -0.1036 
Call After  













Fraud 0.0122 0.0007 0.0176 0.1465** 0.0238 0.0261 0.1487** 
Auditor Letter or Discussion 0.0925 0.0968 0.1672** -0.0774 0.0764 0.1559** 0.1220 
SEC Investigation -0.0924 0.0664 0.0086 0.1320 0.0117 0.0164 0.2108*** 
Board/Audit Committee 0.0767 -0.0384 0.5524*** -0.0584 0.8610*** 0.6495*** -0.0340 
Top Three II Ranking -0.1780** -0.0380 -0.0733 -0.1001 -0.0638 -0.0791 0.0103 
Calls Before 0.2303*** -0.0171 0.0189 -0.0402 0.0304 0.0262 0.1112 
Call After -0.0322 -0.0732 0.0698 0.0603 0.0202 0.0705 -0.0124 
Pervasiveness -0.0572 -0.0125 -0.0815 -0.1091 0.0220 -0.0707 -0.7741*** 
Size 
 
-0.0938 0.2118*** -0.0303 0.0760 0.1967*** 0.0768 
Leverage 
 
 0.0710 0.0707 -0.1066 0.0545 0.0856 
Earnings Change 
 
  -0.0594 0.5780*** 0.9858*** 0.1133 
CAR 
 
   0.0467 -0.0487 0.1092 
Lev-Change in Earnings 
Interaction 
 
    0.6954*** -0.0223 
Size-Change in Earnings 
Interaction 
 
     0.0971 
Core Earnings        
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels. See Appendix I for full list of variable definitions. 
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Table 6 provides a summary of the abnormal returns and CAR over the five-day event 
window (-2 to +2), with day 0 being the restatement announcement date. Panel A displays 
the daily event window market model abnormal returns using the value-weighted index as 
calculated by Eventus. The mean abnormal returns are negative for four of the five days, 
providing support for restatements being considered negative events during the time 
immediately surrounding restatement announcements. The mean abnormal return on day 2 
(-0.22%) is statistically significant at the 1% level. The number of negative abnormal returns 
exceeded positive returns on three of the five days (days -2, -1, and +2). 
Table 6, Panel B, provides the cumulative five-day abnormal returns using the value-
weighted index as calculated by Eventus. The mean CAR over the five days is -0.34%, which 
is statistically significant at the 10% level using the parametric Patell’s Z-statistic (Eventus, 
2007, p. 80). Table 6, Panel B, also reports the precision-weighted mean CAR (-0.44%).  The 
precision-weighted CAR weights individual CARs by the variance of the abnormal returns 
from the estimation period with higher variance stocks contributing less to the mean CAR 
(Eventus, 2007, p. 82). The number of positive CARs (101) exceeds the number of negative 
CARs (98) over the five-day event window. These proportions are not significantly different 
from each other based on the Generalized Sign Z test (Eventus, 2007, p. 88). Consistent with 
prior restatement literature, the -0.34% mean CAR provides evidence of the negative impact 
on stock returns during the five-day period surrounding the restatement announcement date. 
As shown in the descriptive statistics, there is considerable variation in the individual CAR 
with values ranging from approximately -31% to 25%. Given the wide range of CAR and -
0.34% marginally negative mean CAR, these values may suggest that IR could play a role in 
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explaining some of the variation in CAR over the five-day period for restating firms included 
in the sample. 
Table 6. Summary of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)  
Over the Five-Day Event Window (-2,2). 
Panel A: Daily Event Window Market Model  






Negative Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
-2 199 -0.06%  92 :107 -1.267 -0.894 
-1 199 -0.05%  90 :109 -0.855 -1.178 
0 199 0.05% 111 : 88 0.331 1.800** 
1 199 -0.05% 102 : 97 -0.534 0.524 
2 199 -0.22%  85 :114 -2.659*** -1.887** 
Panel B: 5-Day Cumulative Market Model Abnormal Returns Value Weighted Index 




Negative Patell Z 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
(-2,+2) 199 -0.34% -0.44% 101: 98 -1.407* 0.382 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels. 
 
Regression Results and Discussion 
Model Results 
Table 7 presents the OLS regression results for IR activity during the pre-restatement 
period (Calls Before) presented in Hypothesis 1. Both the reduced form and full regression 
models are presented. Hypothesis 1 proposed that firms engaging in more IR activity during 
the 365 days before a restatement announcement would experience a less negative CAR 
during the period surrounding the restatement announcement. The full regression model has 
overall model significance at the 10% level with an F-statistic of 1.67. However, the 
individual coefficient for the independent variable of interest, Calls Before, is not statistically 
significant in either model. Thus, the results of this model do not provide support for 
Hypothesis 1.  
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The following robustness checks were conducted in addition to the full and reduced form 
models discussed above. First, the full model results are analyzed by industry, using the two-
digit SIC code and did not yield any additional significant results or insights. Second, I 
analyze the sample based on the firms pre-announcement CAR during the -90 to -4-day 
window prior to the announcement date. The sample is split into two groups based on the 
median (high pre-announcement CAR and low pre-announcement CAR) to evaluate the 
significance of the independent variable, Calls Before, separately for firms with high versus 
low CAR during the pre-announcement period. The subsample results do not provide 
significant or meaningful results. Third, the restatements in the sample are evaluated based 
on their impact on cumulative change in net income to see if the results differ for firms with 
restatements that had no cumulative impact on net income 144/199 (72%), a positive impact 
on net income 16/199 (8%), or a negative impact on net income 39/199 (20%). The 
relationship between Calls Before and CAR surrounding the announcement was negative and 
significant at the 5% level for the subset of 16 restatements with a positive impact net 
income, opposite the hypothesized relationship. This result suggests that firms that conduct 
more calls in the 365 days before the restatement announcement experience a 2.22% lower 
CAR during the period surrounding the announcement. There are no significant findings for 
restatements with no impact or a negative impact on net income.  
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Table 7. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Pre-Restatement  
Announcement Calls (Hypothesis 1). Dependent Variable CAR Over (-2, 2). 
 Reduced Form Model Full Regression Model 
Calls Before -0.0007 -0.0009 
 (-0.5700) (-0.6500) 
Earnings Change  -0.5928 
  (-0.2600) 
Length  0.0007 
  (0.2100) 
Leverage  0.0203 
  (0.7900) 
Size  0.0023 
  (0.6400) 
Lev-Earnings Change Interaction  19.6833 
  (2.9200)*** 
Size -Earnings Change Interaction  -1.3814 
  (-1.4100) 
Fraud  -0.0422 
  (-0.9200) 
Pervasiveness  -0.009 
  (-0.6800) 
Core Earnings  -0.0035 
  (-0.4100) 
Auditor Letter or Discussion  0.0043 
  (0.7800) 
SEC Investigation  -0.0128 
  (-0.3200) 
Board/Audit Committee  0.1313 
  2.2800** 
Intercept 0.0023 0.0619 
 (0.2100) (0.7900) 
Model Statistics   
N 199 199 
Adjusted R2 (%) -0.3450 4.2500 
F-Statistic 0.3195 1.6764* 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels. See Appendix I for 
full list of variable definitions. 
 
Table 8  presents the Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for investor perceived 
IR quality during the pre-restatement period (Top Three II ranking) presented in Hypothesis 
2. Both the reduced form and full regression models are presented. Hypothesis 2 proposed 
that firms ranked in the top three for Best IR Program based on votes collected by 
Institutional Investor (II) Magazine would experience less negative (higher) CAR during the 
period surrounding the restatement announcement. The full regression model has overall 
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model significance at the 5% level with an F-statistic of 1.78. The direction of the parameter 
estimate for Top Three II Ranking supports Hypothesis 2, indicating that being ranked in the 
top three by II leads to a less negative (higher) CAR. However, the individual coefficient for 
the variable of interest, Top Three II ranking, was not statistically significant in the full or 
reduced form models. Additional notable findings in the full model include restatements that 
involved the firm's board of directors or audit committee lead to a 12.74% higher CAR. This 
relationship was significant at the 5% level. While the direction of the results is consistent 
with the hypothesized relationship, due to the lack of statistical significance, the results do 
not provide support for Hypothesis 2. 
Additional robustness checks were completed to take into account the firm industry, CAR 
during the period immediately before the restatement announcement, and the restatements 
impact on net income. First, the full model results were analyzed by industry, using the two-
digit SIC code and did not yield any additional significant results. Second, the sample was 
split into subgroups for high pre-announcement CAR and low pre-announcement CAR, to 
evaluate the significance of the independent variable, Top Three II Ranking, separately for 
firms with high versus low CAR during the pre-announcement period. The subsample results 
did not provide statisically signficant results. Third, the results were analyzed by the impact 
of the restatement on the cumulative change in net income. No significant results were found 
for firms whose restatements had no impact, a positive impact, or a negative impact on net 
income. 
Table 8 presents the Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for investor 
perceived IR quality during the pre-restatement period (Top Three II ranking) presented in 
Hypothesis 2. Both the reduced form and full regression models are presented. Hypothesis 2 
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proposed that firms ranked in the top three for Best IR Program based on votes collected by 
Institutional Investor (II) Magazine would experience less negative (higher) CAR during the 
period surrounding the restatement announcement. The full regression model has overall 
model significance at the 5% level with an F-statistic of 1.78. The direction of the parameter 
estimate for Top Three II Ranking supports Hypothesis 2, indicating that being ranked in the 
top three by II leads to a less negative (higher) CAR. However, the individual coefficient for 
the variable of interest, Top Three II ranking, was not statistically significant in the full or 
reduced form models. Additional notable findings in the full model include restatements that 
involved the firm's board of directors or audit committee lead to a 12.74% higher CAR. This 
relationship was significant at the 5% level. While the direction of the results is consistent 
with the hypothesized relationship, due to the lack of statistical significance, the results do 
not provide support for Hypothesis 2. 
Additional robustness checks were completed to take into account the firm industry, CAR 
during the period immediately before the restatement announcement, and the restatements 
impact on net income. First, the full model results were analyzed by industry, using the two-
digit SIC code and did not yield any additional significant results. Second, the sample was 
split into subgroups for high pre-announcement CAR and low pre-announcement CAR, to 
evaluate the significance of the independent variable, Top Three II Ranking, separately for 
firms with high versus low CAR during the pre-announcement period. The subsample results 
did not provide statisically signficant results. Third, the results were analyzed by the impact 
of the restatement on the cumulative change in net income. No significant results were found 
for firms whose restatements had no impact, a positive impact, or a negative impact on net 
income. 
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Table 8. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Top Three II Firms (Hypothesis 2). 
Dependent Variable CAR Over (-2, 2). 
 Reduced Form Model Full Regression Model 
Top Three II Ranking 0.0075 0.0071 
 (1.4100) (1.3200) 
Earnings Change  -0.8626 
  (-0.3800) 
Length  0.0006 
  (0.2000) 
Leverage  0.0182 
  (0.7100) 
Size  0.0011 
  (0.3200) 
Lev-Earnings Change Interaction  19.7921 
  (2.9500)*** 
Size-Earnings Change Interaction  -1.4712 
  (-1.5100) 
Fraud  -0.0435 
  (-0.9500) 
Pervasiveness  -0.0072 
  (-0.5600) 
Core Earnings  -0.0043 
  (0.5000) 
Auditor Letter or Discussion  0.0046 
  (0.8500) 
SEC Investigation  -0.0099 
  (-0.2500) 
Board/Audit Committee  0.1274 
  (2.2200)** 
Intercept 0.0014 0.0671 
 (0.2600) (0.8600) 
Model Statistics   
N 199 199 
Adjusted R2  (%) 0.4990 4.9230 
F-Statistic 1.9927 1.7896** 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels. See Appendix I for 
full list of variable definitions. 
 
Table 9 presents the Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for IR activity during 
the post-restatement period (Call After) from Hypothesis 3. Both the reduced form and full 
regression models are presented. Hypothesis 3 predicts that firms engaging in IR activity 
during the post-announcement period from the day of the announcement (0) through the two 
day period following the announcement (+2), would experience a less negative CAR during 
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the period surrounding the restatement announcement, suggesting a positive coefficient. The 
full regression model has overall model significance at the 10% level with an F-statistic of 
1.67. However, the individual coefficient for the variable of interest, Call After, is negative 
though not statistically significant in the full or reduced form models. The results suggest that 
firms who conducted a call within two days of the announcement date experienced a slightly 
lower (more negative) CAR during the five day period surrounding the announcement. These 
results indicate the opposite relationship from what was hypothesized. Perhaps engaging in 
IR activity immediately following a restatement announcement by conducting a conference 
call does not provide protection or reduce the negative impact on stock performance 
following the restatement. Overall, the results of this analysis do not provide support for 
Hypothesis 3. 
Additional robustness checks take into account industry, CAR during the period 
immediately before the restatement announcement, and the restatements impact on net 
income. First, the full model results are analyzed by industry, using the two-digit SIC code 
and do not yield any additional significant results. Second, the sample is split into two 
groups, high and low pre-announcement CAR. The results from the high pre-announcement 
CAR and low pre-announcement CAR subgroups for variable, Call after, are not statistically 
significant. Third, the results were analyzed by the impact of the restatement on the 
cumulative change in net income. Consistent with the results from Hypothesis 2, no 
significant results are found for firms whose restatements had no cumulative impact on net 




Table 9. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Post-Restatement  
Announcement Call (Hypothesis 3). Dependent Variable CAR Over (-2, 2). 
 Reduced Form Model Full Regression Model 
Call After -0.0035 -0.0027 
 (-0.8500) (-0.6300) 
Earnings Change  -0.8611 
  (-0.3800) 
Length  0.0008 
  (0.2400) 
Leverage  0.0214 
  (0.8300) 
Size  0.0020 
  (0.5800) 
Lev-Earnings Change Interaction  19.9454 
  (2.9600)*** 
Size-Earnings Change Interaction  -1.4696 
  (-1.5000) 
Fraud  -0.0391 
  (-0.8500) 
Pervasiveness  -0.0088 
  (-0.6900) 
Core Earnings  -0.0031 
  (-0.3600) 
Auditor Letter or Discussion  0.0038 
  (0.6900) 
SEC Investigation  -0.0147 
  (-0.3700) 
Board/Audit Committee  0.1263 
  (2.1700)** 
Intercept  0.0533 
  (0.6700) 
Model Statistics   
N 199 199 
Adjusted R2 (%) -0.1420 4.2400 
F-Statistic 0.7192 1.6740* 
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels. See Appendix I for 
full list of variable definitions. 
 
Discussion 
Prior literature shows that the benefits of engaging in IR include increased liquidity 
(Agarwal et al., 2008, 2016; Kirk & Vincent, 2014), lower cost of capital (Ly, 2010), higher 
stock prices (Agarwal et al., 2008), higher market value (Karolyi & Liao, 2017; Agarwal et 
al., 2016), and positive future operating performance (Jiao, 2011). Negative impacts on stock 
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performance following restatement announcements are also well established in the literature 
(Ettredge et al., 2013; Burks, 2011; Badertscher et al., 2011; Kravet & Shevlin, 2010; 
Palmrose et al., 2004; Hribar & Jenkins, 2004; Anderson & Yohn, 2002; Dechow et al., 
1996). The impact of IR on stock performance in the context of restatements has yet to be 
researched. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of IR activity and IR quality 
on CAR, during the period surrounding restatement announcements. 
As discussed in my hypotheses, I anticipated finding significant positive relationships 
between 1) the number of conference calls conducted in the pre-announcement period, 2) II 
Magazine top three Best IR firm rankings during the pre-announcement period, and 
3) conference calls conducted during the post-announcement period and the CAR during the 
period surrounding restatement announcements. Based on a limited sample of 199 S&P 500 
firms, the results of my analysis did not find support for any of the hypothesized 
relationships. There could be a number of reasons for this. Simply having more information 
available through IR activity, such as the presence of conference calls, may not be 
meaningful enough to impact CAR in the wake of restatement announcements for this 
sample of restatements.  
Evaluating a larger and more diverse group of firms beyond the S&P 500 may provide 
additional insights and support for the proposed relationships. In addition, the restatements in 
the sample consisted only of “little r” revision restatements, which tend to have a less 
material impact on a firm’s financial position. For this study, there were not enough “big R” 
reissuance restatements from S&P 500 firms during the sample period to provide a 
meaningful analysis. However, a sample of “big R” reissuance restatements, which tend to be 
more material and communicate that investors should no longer rely on previously issued 
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financial statements (SEC, 2019), would likely provide more insights into the relationship 
between IR activity, IR quality, and CAR surrounding restatement announcements.   
Future studies may consider using additional measures for both IR activity and investor 
perceived IR quality. The count or existence of conference call transcripts serves as only one 
potential proxy for IR activity. Simply capturing the count or existence of transcripts 
provides equal weight to each transcript regardless of the content of information shared or the 
duration of the call. Future studies may use textual analysis for a more detailed evaluation of 
the information shared during conference calls. The Top 3 II Ranking proxy for investor 
perceived IR quality was intended to measure the quality of a firm’s IR program as perceived 
by buy-side analysts. It is important to note that the II data used for this measure only 
includes the perceptions of buy-side analysts. The perceptions of sell-side analysts were not 
included in this measure. It may be that the II rankings from the buy-side do not provide an 
adequate measure for investor perceived IR quality or that the votes from the Best IR poll 
instead measure a different construct than perceived IR quality.  
Directions for Future Research 
IR continues to be an area with many opportunities for future research (Agarwal et al., 
2016; Kirk & Vincent, 2014). Future studies may investigate a broader range of companies 
beyond the S&P 500. Providing more diversity in firm size and variation in the amount of IR 
activity and the quality of IR programs may provide additional insights into the relationship 
between IR and CAR during the period surrounding restatement announcements. Evaluating 
a broader range of firm sizes, specifically smaller companies, may also provide additional 
insights since smaller companies have a higher likelihood of issuing restatements (Scholz, 
2014). Future studies may also evaluate whether firms use IR as a form of insurance to help 
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protect against the negative impacts of future bad news announcements. Do firms engage in 
more IR to soften the blow of future bad news, or do firms use IR to help recover after bad 
news is released? Investigating whether restating firms engage in more IR activity compared 
to non-restating firms may also provide helpful insights into how firms use IR.  
Future studies may also investigate the relative importance of restatement disclosure 
methods (“little r” revisions versus “big R” reissuances). In 2014, the Center for Audit 
Quality released a report of restatement trends in the United States from 2003 through 2012. 
The report found that 35% of restatements announced in 2012 were reissuance restatements, 
compared to 61% in 2005 and 53% in 2006 (Scholz, 2014). During this period, firms gained 
more discretion on how to classify restatements as revisions or reissuances (Hogan & Jonas, 
2016). Classifying more restatements as revisions may reduce transparency for investors and 
other stakeholders, even if the impact of the restatements is material. Future studies may 
evaluate the impact of IR activity on CAR for a broader set of revision restatements and 
assess changes over time. IR may have more impact on investor reaction to revision 
restatements now than in the past due to the increased discretion available to firms in how 
restatements are disclosed.  
Conclusions 
IR continues to serve an important purpose and provide many avenues for future 
research. Additional research is needed in the area of IR in the context of restatements. Prior 
research shows that in the wake of a restatement, investors question information provided by 
management and have concerns regarding financial statement reporting quality (Badertscher 
et al., 2011; Palmrose et al., 2004; Hribar & Jenkins, 2004; Ettredge et al., 2013). While IR 
may be useful to help investors stay informed, simply providing more information may not 
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be enough to mitigate the negative impact on stock returns following restatement 
announcements. Perhaps simply providing more information through various IR activities 
does not insulate large firms from the negative impacts on stock performance following 
restatements. Or perhaps the IR activity is associated with stock performance outside the 
immediate window surrounding a restatement announcement. While this study provides 
limited insights into the relationship between IR and CAR for restating S&P 500 firms, many 
opportunities for future research exist.   
Study Limitations 
First, the sample size of 199 provides an inherent limitation since it only accounts for a 
small sample of the population of firms who issue restatements. Second, the sample was 
restricted to only the S&P 500 firms, which does not include small or medium-sized U.S. 
companies. Third, due to data availability for S&P 500 firms during the sample period, only 
revision (“little r”) restatements were included in the analysis. Prior research shows 
reissuance, or “big R” restatements, generally have a significantly more negative impact on 
CARs for firms in the wake of restatement announcements (Scholz, 2014; Sievers & 
Sofilkanitsch, 2018). Each of these constraints on the sample size reduces the generalizability 
of the results. Fourth, this study only evaluated whether a conference call took place on the 
day of the announcement or within two days after the announcement. It may be helpful to 
evaluate IR activity over a longer period of time after a restatement is announced to gain 
additional insights into the impact of IR activity. Finally, alternative measures may be 
available to capture the IR quality and IR activity independent variables. For example, the 
Institutional Investor Magazine data was intended to capture investors’ perceptions of the 
quality of a firm's IR program before a restatement announcement, but the votes likely do not 
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fully capture investors’ perceptions of IR quality. Additional factors, in addition to quality, 
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Dependent Variable  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR) 
The sum of daily abnormal stock returns over the 
restatement announcement window (day – 2 to day +2) 
calculated by subtracting the CRSP value weighted index 
from the daily individual stock returns. 
Independent Variables 
 
 Calls Before Quantifies the amount of IR activity that occurred during the 
365-day period before the restatement announcement date 
using a count of transcripts from the Capital IQ database. 
Calls before is measured using the count of transcripts for 
conference presentations, earnings calls, M&A calls, 
Analyst/Investor Days, Shareholder/Analyst calls, and 
Guidance/Update calls during the 365 days before the 
restatement announcement. 
Top Three II Ranking Indicator variable used to assess investor perceived IR 
quality. Top Three II Ranking is based on buy-side 
analysts votes in the “Best Investor Relations Program” by 
Institutional Investor (II) Magazine. Firms ranked in the 
top three within their industry by buy-side analysts are 
considered to have higher investor perceived IR quality 
compared to firms not ranked within the top three in their 
industry. 0 = the restating firm was included in the Top 
Three II Ranking 1 = the restating firm was not included in 
the Top Three II Ranking. 
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Call After Indicator variable used to identify the existence of at least one 
conference call in the Capital IQ database during the post-
restatement announcement period. The post-announcement period 
extends from the day of the restatement announcement through the 
two-day period after the announcement. IR activity is measured as 
the number of transcripts for conference presentations, earnings 
calls, M&A calls, Analyst/Investor Days, Shareholder/Analyst calls, 
and Guidance/Update calls from the day of the restatement 
announcement through the two days after the announcement. 0 = one 
or more calls occurred during the post-announcement period 1 = a 
call did not occur during the post-announcement period.  
Control Variables   
Fraud Indicator variable used to identify if the restatement involved 
fraudulent activity (Audit Analytics, 2020). 0 = restatement involved 
fraud 1 = restatement did not involve fraud. 
Auditor Letter or 
Discussion 
Indicates disclosure of the auditor’s knowledge or involvement in the 
restatement (Audit Analytics, 2020). 0 = auditor involvement 1 = no 
known auditor involvement. 
SEC Investigation Indicates SEC involvement in the restatement process including an 
SEC comment letter that triggered the restatement; or formal or 
informal SEC inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the 
restatement (Audit Analytics, 2020). 0 = SEC involvement 1 = no 
SEC involvement. 
Board/Audit Committee Indicates disclosure of Board of Directors and/or Audit Committee’s 
knowledge or involvement of the restatement (Audit Analytics, 
2020). 0 = BOD/Audit Committee knew about the restatement 1 = 
BOD/Audit Committee did not know about the restatement.  
Core Earnings Indicates if the restatement impacted the firms core earnings. 0 = 
restatement impacted the firms core earnings 1 = restatement did not 
impact the firms core earnings. 
Earnings Change Calculated by dividing the amount of the earnings restatement by the 
total assets at the end of the prior period. 
Pervasiveness  The number of account groups involved in the restatement. The five 
account groups include revenue, cost of sales, operating expenses, 
merger-related, and other. 
Length The total number of time periods included in the restatement measured 
as 0.25 per quarter or 1.0 per year. 
Leverage Book value of long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets 
as of yearend prior to the restatement announcement. 
Size Natural log of the book value of total assets at the fiscal year end prior 
to the restatement announcement. 
Lev - Change in 
Earnings Interaction 
Interaction variable between Leverage and Earnings Change. 
Size - Change in 
Earnings Interaction 
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